Characters of Khalkhin Gol. Who commanded at Khalkhin Gol? Brigade commander Mikhail Andreevich Bogdanov
14:50
Khalkhin Gol. Two years before the Great Patriotic War.
In 1932, the occupation of Manchuria by Japanese troops ended. The puppet state of Manchukuo was created in the occupied territory. The conflict began with the demands of the Japanese side to recognize the Khalkhin Gol River as the border between Manchukuo and Mongolia (the old border ran 20–25 km to the east).
On March 12, 1936, the “Protocol on Mutual Assistance” was signed between the USSR and the MPR. Since 1937, in accordance with this protocol, units of the Red Army were deployed on the territory of Mongolia. The main striking force of the Red Army in Far Eastern District consisted of three motorized armored brigades (7th, 8th and 9th) - unique formations consisting of FAI, BAI, BA-3, BA-6, BA-10 and BA-20 armored vehicles.
There a strong barrier has been put up for the enemy,
Standing there, brave and strong,
At the edge of the Far Eastern land
Armored Shock Battalion.
Since 1936, the 7th infantry brigade was commanded by N.V. Feklenko, who later became the commander of the 57th Special Corps (the brigade became part of the corps in August 1937, having marched under its own power from the Western Military District to the Mongolian People's Republic).
By August 15, 1938, the 57 OK included 273 light tanks (of which about 80% were BT type), 150 machine guns and 163 cannon armored vehicles.
In 1938, a two-week conflict occurred between Soviet and Japanese troops near Lake Khasan, which ended in victory for the USSR. Artillery, tanks and aircraft were widely used in combat operations. During the armed conflict at Lake Khasan, significant shortcomings were revealed in the combat training of the Far Eastern Army, especially in the interaction of military branches in battle, command and control of troops, and their mobilization readiness.
On May 11, 1939, a detachment of Japanese cavalry numbering up to 300 people attacked the Mongolian border outpost at the height of Nomon-Khan-Burd-Obo. On May 14, as a result of a similar attack with air support, the Dungur-Obo heights were occupied. The Mongolian side requested support from the USSR. The Japanese justified their actions by saying that the mentioned heights belonged to their satellite Manchukuo. In total, two infantry regiments and reinforcement units with a total number of up to 10 thousand people initially operated on the Japanese side.
Immediately after the conflict broke out, Feklenko reported to the center: “All Manchu notes sent to the MPR government indicate that clashes in the Nomon-Khan-Burd-Obo area are taking place on Manchu territory. Given this situation, he demanded documents from the MPR government. The material was checked together with Plenipotentiary Representative Choibalsan and Lunsansharab. Thus, all events take place not on Manchurian territory, but on the territory of the MPR.” It was possible to act openly.
On May 17, the commander of the 57th OK division commander N.V. Feklenko sent an operational group to Khalkhin Gol consisting of three motorized rifle companies, a company of armored vehicles, a sapper company and an artillery battery. On May 22, Soviet troops crossed the Khalkhin Gol River and drove the Japanese back from the border.
Clashes between Soviet and Japanese troops escalated into battles with the use of aviation, artillery and tanks. No one declared war on anyone, but the intensity of the fighting increased. Not everything went smoothly for the Soviet troops.
During the period from May 22 to 28, significant forces are concentrated in the conflict area. The Soviet-Mongolian forces included 668 bayonets, 260 sabers, 58 machine guns, 20 guns and 39 armored vehicles. Japanese forces consisted of 1,680 bayonets, 900 cavalry, 75 machine guns, 18 guns, 6 armored vehicles and 1 tank.
On May 28, 1939, Japanese units numbering up to 2,500 people, supported by artillery, armored vehicles and aviation, violated the border of the Mongolian People's Republic east of the Khalkhin Gol River, but by the end of May 29, Soviet-Mongolian troops had driven the aggressor out of their territory.
The importance that the Soviet leadership attached to the events at Khalkhin Gol also led to the special attention of the People's Commissariat of Defense and the General Staff of the Red Army to it. In order to check the condition and combat readiness of units of the 57th Separate Corps, on May 29, Deputy Commander of the Belarusian Military District for Cavalry, Divisional Commander G.K., flies to Mongolia. Zhukov together with brigade commander Denisov and regimental commissar Chernyshev.
On June 3, 1939, he reports: “Since May 29, they have not been able to achieve the complete introduction of hidden command and control of troops... The reason for this is that, despite promises, forgotten commander codes have not yet been delivered from winter quarters.”
According to Zhukov’s recollections, “the corps command does not know the true situation... no one from the corps command, except for the regimental commissar M.S. Nikishev, was in the area of events. I asked N.V. Feklenko, what does he think, is it possible for 120 kilometers from the battlefield to control troops?
People's Commissar of Defense K.E. Voroshilov in an address dated June 9, 1939 to the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and on June 11, 1939 personally to I.V. Stalin proposes to remove division commander N.V. from leadership of the Special Corps. Feklenko, his chief of staff, brigade commander A.M. Kushchev and the chief of aviation of the corps Kalinichev.
Voroshilov accused Feklenko of the lack of “close communication with the command of the MPR,” the need for which he repeatedly pointed out, believing that this led to the fact that Feklenko was unable to timely convey to the attention of the top leadership in Moscow information about developments on the border of the MPR and Manchuria. Voroshilov, in particular, argued that “both the People’s Commissar of Defense and the General Staff still cannot establish the true picture of what happened.” Voroshilov argued that “the corps command and Feklenko personally disbanded the units, did not organize the rear at all, and there is very low discipline in the troops.”
G.K. takes command of the 57th OK. Zhukov. Brigade commander M.A. became the chief of staff of the corps. Bogdanov. Corps Commissar J. Lkhagvasuren became Zhukov’s assistant in command of the Mongolian cavalry. From the “old guard” Zhukov kept with him only divisional commissar M.S. Nikisheva.
Having completed advanced training courses for command personnel at the Academy of Motorization and Mechanization, N.V. Feklenko was appointed commander of the 14th Tank Brigade, located in Zhitomir. Subsequently, he received the rank of Major General of Tank Forces with the appointment of commander of the 8th Tank Division in June and the 15th Tank Division of the 8th MK KOVO in July 1940. And in March 1941 he became commander of the 19th Mechanized Corps, which participated on June 26-29 in a counterattack against the 1st Tank Group, and on July 2-8 covered the retreat of the 5th Army to the line of the old state border (by July 9, 75 tanks remained in the corps out of 450 listed at the beginning of the war). On July 10-14, the mechanized corps counterattacked in the Novograd-Volyn direction, on July 23 - August 5 it fought on the main strip of the Korosten UR, after which its remnants joined the 31st Rifle Corps on August 6, and the headquarters of the corps and divisions were sent to the headquarters of the South -Western Front. War N.V. Feklenko graduated as head of the Main Directorate for the Formation and Combat Training of Armored and Mechanized Troops of the Red Army.
First of all, Zhukov strengthens the 100th air brigade covering the corps from the air. Discipline in the air brigade was rated as “the lowest.” Fighter pilots were trained only in the technique of piloting single aircraft and did not have the skills of group air combat. Most of them did not even have aerial shooting skills. In May 1939, Japanese pilots, who had gained experience fighting in China, fought air battles with Soviet pilots with virtually no losses.
Colonel T. Kutsevalov said: “The 57th Special Corps had aviation, which can be described in terms of combat effectiveness simply as collapsed aviation... which, of course, looked incapable of combat.” There were no air bases on the territory of the Mongolian People's Republic. A serious shortcoming in the Air Force's preparation for combat was complete absence communications between bases.
In the report compiled by Kutsevalov on the combat operations of the Soviet Air Force at Khalkhin Gol, it was directly stated: “In the initial period of the conflict, the air forces of the 57th Special Corps suffered a clear, shameful defeat.” Thus, in two days of fighting, the Soviet fighter regiment lost 15 fighters (mostly I-15s), while the Japanese side lost only one aircraft.
On May 28, after the death of Balashov’s squadron, the commander of the 57th OK corps commander Feklenko wrote in a combat report addressed to the Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army B.M. Shaposhnikov that Japanese aviation dominates the air, and our pilots are not able to cover ground troops, “Japanese aviation penetrates deep into the territory of the Mongolian People’s Republic and is chasing our aircraft.” After Feklenko’s report that maintaining a bridgehead on the eastern shore of Khalkhin Gol would only be possible at the cost of heavy losses from Japanese aviation, a whole delegation of specialists with experience of the war in Spain and China flew to Mongolia. It consisted of 48 pilots and specialists, including 11 Heroes of the Soviet Union, among whom was the deputy chief of the Red Army Air Force, corps commander Yakov Smushkevich.
Air battles resumed with renewed vigor in the twentieth of June. As a result of the battles on June 22, 24 and 26, the Japanese lost more than 50 aircraft. During the battle on June 22, the famous Japanese ace pilot Takeo Fukuda was shot down and captured (according to other sources, senior lieutenant Hero of the Soviet Union V.G. Rakhov shot down his plane on July 29, the Japanese, seeing that he had landed on Mongolian territory, tried shoot himself, but was captured).
In the early morning of June 27, Japanese aircraft managed to launch a surprise attack on Soviet airfields, which led to the destruction of 19 aircraft.
In total, Japanese air forces lost 90 aircraft in air battles from June 22 to 28. The losses of Soviet aviation were much smaller, amounting to 38 aircraft.
New air units with I-16 arrived, obsolete aircraft were withdrawn from the existing units. A number of new landing sites were equipped near the front line, which had a positive effect on the speed and efficiency of the Air Force's response to the situation at the front. Smushkevich's group ensured air superiority over the Japanese. By the beginning of July, Soviet aviation at Khalkhin Gol consisted of 280 combat-ready aircraft versus 100-110 Japanese.
In the Chita area, front-line control is being deployed under the command of Army Commander 2nd Rank G.M. Stern, a hero of the war in Spain and a participant in the battles at Lake Khasan. Divisional Commander M.A., a teacher at the General Staff Academy, became the chief of staff of the front group. Kuznetsov. Member of the Military Council of the group - divisional commissar N.I. Biryukov
The group included the 1st and 2nd separate Red Banner armies, troops of the Transbaikal Military District and the 57th Special Corps. On June 19, by order of the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR No. 0029, the 57th Special Corps was renamed the 1st Army Group.
To restore discipline in the troops, Zhukov was given very broad powers. On initial stage During the conflict, unfired rifle units suffered huge losses, easily succumbed to panic, voluntarily abandoned their positions and retreated to the rear in disarray. According to the memoirs of General Staff officer P.G. Grigorenko, sent to reinforcement in Mongolia, the military council of the front group, on behalf of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, pardoned 17 people sentenced to death by the tribunal of the 1st Army Group with the wording “Tribunal. I received an order. Didn't complete it. Judge. Shoot!". Personal relations between Zhukov and Stern, according to eyewitnesses, were quite hostile, but the division commander was nevertheless obliged to follow the instructions of the army commander.
By the beginning of the next offensive, the command of the Japanese Kwantung Army concentrated up to 38 thousand soldiers and officers with the support of 310 guns, 135 tanks and 225 aircraft against 12.5 thousand soldiers, 109 guns, 266 armored vehicles, 186 tanks and 280 aircraft of the Red Army and Mongolia.
The headquarters of the Kwantung Army developed a plan for a new border operation called “The Second Period of the Nomonhan Incident.” The Japanese brought up all three regiments of the 23rd Infantry Division, two regiments of the 7th Infantry Division, a cavalry division of the Manchukuo Army, two tank and artillery regiments. The Japanese plan provided for two strikes - the main one and the restraining one. The first involved crossing the Khalkhin Gol River and access to crossings to the rear of Soviet troops on the eastern bank of the river. The group of Japanese troops for this attack was led by Major General Kobayashi. The second blow was to be launched by Lieutenant General Masaomi Yasuoka directly against the Soviet troops in the bridgehead. Due to the fact that the Japanese were unable to provide their tank units with transport means, only the Yasuoka group was reinforced with tanks.
The Yasuoka group's attack began at 10:00 on July 2. The advance of Japanese tanks continued until 2.00 am on July 3. Despite the fact that of the 73 tanks that took part in the Yasuoka group’s attack on the Soviet bridgehead on July 3, 41 tanks were lost, 13 of them irretrievably, the Japanese assessed the results of their attack as “very high.” By the night of July 3, the Soviet troops, due to the numerical superiority of the enemy, retreated to the river, reducing the size of their eastern bridgehead on its bank, but the Japanese strike group did not fully complete the task assigned to it.
The dew lay thick on the grass,
The fogs are widespread.
That night the samurai decided
Cross the border by the river.
On the night of July 2-3, the troops of Major General Kobayashi crossed the Khalkhin Gol River and captured Mount Bain-Tsagan on its western bank, located 40 kilometers from the Manchurian border. Immediately after this, the Japanese concentrated their main forces here and began to extremely intensively build fortifications and build layered defenses. In the future, it was planned, relying on Mount Bain-Tsagan, which dominated the area, to hit the rear of the Soviet troops defending on the eastern bank of the Khalkhin Gol River, cut them off and subsequently destroy them. The Mongolian cavalry division located in the area of Mount Bain-Tsagan was scattered by Japanese planes.
Meanwhile, Zhukov, having no intelligence information about the bridgehead captured by the Japanese, began preparing a flank attack on the Yasuoka group. To do this, on the night of July 2-3, the concentration of the 11th tank and 7th motorized armored brigades and Mongolian cavalry began.
At 7.00 in the morning, units of a motorized armored brigade moving towards their initial positions for a counterattack encountered the Japanese. This is how information was received about the Japanese crossing and the direction of their attack. (According to the seventh chapter of “Memories and Reflections” by G.K. Zhukov, the enemy was discovered by the senior adviser to the Mongolian army, Colonel I.M. Afonin).
Zhukov makes a very risky “cavalry” decision to attack on the move a group of Japanese who crossed, unknown in composition and number, with all the mobile reserves advancing from the rear, preventing them from burying themselves in the ground and organizing anti-tank defense. During daylight hours, as the participating forces approached, four uncoordinated attacks were launched (as three tank battalions of the 11th Tank Brigade and an armored battalion of the 7th Tank Brigade advanced from different directions for the initially planned counterattack).
11th Tank Brigade M.P. Yakovleva advanced without artillery and infantry support against the unsuppressed anti-tank defenses of the Japanese, as a result of which she suffered heavy losses. As one Japanese officer put it figuratively, “the funeral pyres of burning Russian tanks were like the smoke of the steel mills in Osaka.” The armored battalion attacked on the move after a 150-kilometer march. Later they were joined by the 24th motorized rifle regiment of Colonel I. I. Fedyuninsky.
At the same time as tanks and armored cars, air strikes were carried out on the Japanese who had crossed. Moreover, not only SB bombers operated, but also I-15bis fighters from the 22nd Fighter Aviation Regiment. The heavy artillery battalion of the 185th Artillery Regiment was ordered to send reconnaissance to Mount Bain Tsagan and open fire on the Japanese group. At the same time, an order was given to the artillery located across the Khalkhin Gol River (supporting the 9th Motorized Armored Brigade) to transfer its fire to the enemy on Mount Bain-Tsagan.
Of the 133 tanks participating in the attack, 77 vehicles were lost, and of 59 armored vehicles, 37. The 2nd tank battalion lost 12 people killed and 9 wounded, the 3rd battalion 10 killed and 23 missing. The tanks and armored cars suffered the greatest losses from anti-tank artillery and from “bottle shooters” - approximately 80-90% of all losses. The 11th Tank Brigade no longer participated in hostilities at this stage, being replenished with materiel - as of July 20, the brigade already numbered 125 tanks.
It should be noted that in this situation Zhukov violated the requirements of the Battle Regulations of the Red Army, and his own order: “I forbid introducing tank and armored units into battle against an enemy who has entrenched himself and prepared his defense without serious artillery preparation. When entering battle, these units must be reliably covered by artillery fire to avoid unnecessary losses.” The division commander acted at his own peril and risk, and contrary to the opinion of army commander G.M. Stern. However, Stern subsequently admitted that in that situation the decision made turned out to be correct - at any cost it was impossible to allow the Japanese to cut off our group on the bridgehead from crossings.
The Japanese did not expect a tank attack of such a scale, and at 20.20 on July 3, an order was given to withdraw troops from the bridgehead captured in the morning. Here is what the Japanese soldier Nakamura wrote about these events in his diary on July 3: “Several dozen tanks suddenly attacked our units. We were in terrible confusion, the horses neighed and ran away, dragging the limbers of the guns behind them; cars rushed in all directions. 2 of our planes were shot down in the air. The entire staff lost heart."
The withdrawal was to begin on the morning of July 4th. A group of Japanese troops on Mount Bayin-Tsagan found themselves semi-surrounded. By the evening of July 4, Japanese troops held only the top of Bain Tsagan, a narrow strip of terrain five kilometers long and two kilometers wide. The crossing lasted all day on July 4th and ended only at 6.00 am on July 5th. All this time, the Japanese crossing were subjected to artillery fire and air attacks. SB bombers carried out two sorties a day, but were unable to bomb the Japanese crossing. I-16 fighters with 20-mm cannons were also involved in air attacks.
These events became known as the “Bain-Tsagan Massacre.” The result of the battles on July 3-6 was that in the future, Japanese troops no longer dared to cross to the western bank of the Khalkhin Gol River. All further events took place on the eastern bank of the river.
As G.K. later wrote. Zhukov: “The experience of the battle in the Bayin-Tsagan area showed that in the form of tank and mechanized troops, skillfully interacting with aviation and mobile artillery, we have a decisive means for carrying out rapid operations with a decisive goal.”
Through the special department of the corps, a report was transmitted to Moscow, which landed on I.V.’s desk. Stalin, that Divisional Commander Zhukov “deliberately” threw a tank brigade into battle without reconnaissance and infantry escort. An investigative commission was sent from Moscow, headed by Deputy People's Commissar of Defense, Army Commander 1st Rank G.I. Kulik. However, he began to interfere in the operational control of the troops, inviting Zhukov to leave the bridgehead, so the People's Commissar of Defense reprimanded him in a telegram dated July 15 and recalled him to Moscow. After this, the head of the Main Political Directorate of the Red Army, Commissar 1st Rank L.Z., was sent to Khalkhin Gol. Mehlis with instructions from L.P. Beria to “check” Zhukov.
Attacks on July 8-11 and July 24-25 were also repulsed. In the night battle on July 8, the commander of the 149th Infantry Regiment, Major I.M., died heroically. Remizov. He was posthumously awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. In one of the counterattacks on July 11, the commander of the 11th Tank Brigade, M. Yakovlev, was killed, raising the lying infantry, which did not want to follow the tanks. The 24th Motorized Rifle Regiment and two battalions of the 5th Rifle-Machine-Gun Brigade were additionally transferred to the bridgehead held by the 145th Motorized Rifle Regiment and the 603rd Regiment of the 82nd Infantry Division.
During the development of the offensive operation against Japanese troops, proposals were put forward both at the headquarters of the army group and at the General Staff of the Red Army to transfer combat operations from the territory of Mongolia to Manchurian territory, but these proposals were categorically rejected by the political leadership of the country.
The Japanese command, despite major losses, began preparing a general offensive timed to coincide with Germany's supposed outbreak of war in Europe. By special decree of the Japanese Emperor on August 10, the 6th Army was formed under the command of Ogisu Rippo, numbering about 55 thousand people (according to other sources - up to 85 thousand, including the army of the Manchukuo state) with 500 guns, 182 tanks and more than 500 aircraft.
They were opposed by 57 thousand soldiers of the Soviet-Mongolian army, having 542 guns and mortars, 498 tanks, 385 armored vehicles and 515 aircraft. In addition to the previously transferred 82nd Rifle Division from the Ural Military District, the 6th Tank Brigade (M.I. Pavelkin), the 57th Infantry Division (I.V. Galanin) and the 212th Airborne Brigade were additionally transferred from the ZabVO.
General coordination of actions was entrusted to front-line control headed by Army Commander 2nd Rank G.M. Stern, who ensured continuous supply of the advanced group of troops. People, military equipment, ammunition, and food had to be transported in vehicles along dirt roads. Moreover, the distance from the nearest unloading station to the combat area was more than 700 kilometers. Despite all the difficulties (the 1,400 km flight lasted five days), a two-week supply of ammunition was accumulated before the offensive.
The movement of vehicles and military equipment, as a rule, was carried out only at night with the strictest observance of blackout. When transferring new units, combined marches were widely used - the soldiers rode part of the way in cars, and covered the rest on foot.
As Zhukov later wrote:
“To carry out the upcoming very complex operation, we needed to transport the following along dirt roads from the supply station to the Khalkhin Gol River, a distance of 650 kilometers:
- artillery ammunition - 18,000 tons;
- ammunition for aviation - 6500 tons;
- various fuels and lubricants - 15,000 tons;
- food of all types - 4000 tons;
- fuel - 7500 tons;
- other cargo - 4000 tons.
To transport all these cargoes to the start of the operation, 4,900 vehicles were required, while the army group had only 2,636 vehicles at its disposal. After August 14, another 1,250 on-board vehicles and 375 tank trucks arriving from the Soviet Union began to be delivered. The main burden of transportation fell on the military road transport and for combat vehicles, including artillery tractors. We decided to take such an extreme measure because, firstly, we had no other choice and, secondly, because we considered the defense of our troops to be quite stable.”
The troops carefully prepared for the offensive operation. In the immediate rear, warriors were trained in close combat techniques. We were introduced to the peculiarities of enemy tactics and defense. Particular attention in the classes was paid to the interaction of infantry with tanks, artillery and aviation in combat.
“In order to camouflage and keep our activities in the strictest confidence, the Military Council of the army group, simultaneously with the plan for the upcoming operation, developed a plan for operational-tactical deception of the enemy, which included:
Conducting covert movements and concentrations of arriving troops from the Soviet Union to strengthen the army group;
- secretive regroupings of forces and assets located in defense across the Khalkhin Gol River;
- carrying out secret crossings of troops and material supplies across the Khalkhin Gol River;
- carrying out reconnaissance of the initial areas, sectors and directions for the action of troops;
- highly secret training of tasks of all branches of the military participating in the upcoming operation;
- conducting covert additional reconnaissance by all types and branches of the military;
- issues of disinformation and deception of the enemy in order to mislead him regarding our intentions.
By these measures, we sought to create the impression among the enemy that there were no preparatory measures of an offensive nature on our side, to show that we were carrying out extensive work to organize defense, and only defense. For this purpose, it was decided to carry out all movements, concentrations, and regroupings only at night, when enemy air reconnaissance activities and visual observation were extremely limited.
Until August 17-18, it was strictly forbidden to withdraw troops to areas from which it was planned to launch attacks with the goal of our troops reaching the flanks and rear of the entire enemy group. The command staff carrying out reconnaissance on the ground had to travel in Red Army uniform and only in trucks.
We knew that the enemy was conducting radio reconnaissance and eavesdropping on telephone conversations, and we developed an entire program of radio and telephone messages for the purpose of disinformation. Negotiations were conducted only on the construction of defenses and preparing them for the autumn-winter campaign. Radio deception was based mainly on a code that could easily be deciphered.
Many thousands of leaflets and several reminders to fighters in defense were published. These leaflets and memos were planted on the enemy so that it could be seen in what direction the political preparation of the Soviet-Mongolian troops was going.”
General Ogisu and his staff also planned an offensive, which was scheduled for 24 August. At the same time, taking into account the sad experience of the battles on Mount Bain-Tsagan for the Japanese, this time an enveloping strike was planned on the right flank of the Soviet group. Crossing the river was not planned.
Early in the morning of August 20, having forestalled an enemy attack, Soviet artillery carried out a surprise artillery raid on Japanese command posts and anti-aircraft batteries. After the first fire raid there was a massive bomber strike, then artillery preparation lasting 2 hours 45 minutes. At the moment the fire was transferred from the front edge to the depths, Soviet rifle divisions, motorized armored and tank brigades launched attacks on the northern and southern flanks of the Japanese group.
Tanks rushed, raising the wind,
A formidable armor was advancing.
And the samurai flew to the ground
Under the pressure of steel and fire.
The main blow from the south was delivered by Potapov’s group, including the 57th Infantry Division and the 6th Tank Brigade. Alekseenko’s group (the new commander of the 11th Tank Brigade, replenished with BT-7 tanks to 200 vehicles) struck from the north. The maneuver of the 11th Tank Brigade was identical to that interrupted by the Japanese attack on July 3. The 9th Motorized Armored Brigade and the Airborne Brigade were in reserve. The center of the formation was the 82nd Rifle Division under the command of brigade commander D.E. Petrov. Also participating in the operation were the Mongol 6th and 8th Cavalry Divisions under the overall command of Marshal Khorlogiin Choibalsan.
Before a large-scale offensive, it was vital to obtain accurate intelligence about the opposing enemy, but obtaining this information had certain difficulties.
“The difficulty of obtaining information about the enemy was aggravated by the absence of a civilian population in the area of operations from whom something could be learned. There were no defectors on the Japanese side. And the Barguts (Mongol herders living in the northwestern part of Manchuria) who fled to us, as a rule, knew nothing about the location and number of Japanese units and formations. We received the best data from reconnaissance in force. However, this data only covered the front line and the nearest artillery and mortar firing positions.
Our reconnaissance aircraft provided good aerial photographs of the depth of the defense, but given that the enemy usually made extensive use of dummies and other deceptive actions, we had to be very careful in our conclusions and establish through repeated checks what was real and what was false.
It was rare for small reconnaissance groups to penetrate into the depths of the enemy’s defenses, since the Japanese had a very good look at the terrain in the area where their troops were located.”
The northern and southern attack groups crossed to the western shore of Khalkhin Gol only on the night of July 19. This ensured the surprise of the attack on the morning of July 20.
“By dawn, everything had to be hidden in the thickets along the river in prepared shelters. The artillery equipment, mortars, propulsion equipment and various equipment were carefully covered with camouflage nets made from local scrap materials. Tank units were withdrawn to their original areas in small groups from different directions, immediately before the start of artillery and air preparation. Their speed allowed them to do it.”
Poor reconnaissance work was again revealed: the northern group was unable to immediately break through the defense, the key to which, as it turned out, was the heavily fortified height of “Palea”. During the offensive of the southern group, the 6th Tank Brigade was late in crossing - the pontoon bridge built by the sappers could not withstand the weight of the tanks. The crossing and concentration of the brigade were completely completed by the end of the day.
By the end of the day, the rifle troops had advanced up to 12 km, overcoming desperate resistance, and began to encircle the Japanese army, and the mechanized units reached the Mongolian-Chinese border.
On August 22, the Japanese troops, having come to their senses, fought stubborn defensive battles, so G.K. Zhukov had to bring the reserve 9th motorized armored brigade into the battle.
On August 23, in the central sector of the front, G.K. Zhukov even had to bring his last reserve into battle: an airborne brigade and two companies of border guards, although in doing so he took considerable risks. By the end of the day, the main forces of the 6th Army were surrounded on Mongolian territory, unable to retreat towards China, which they occupied.
On August 24, four regiments of the Japanese army nevertheless went on the offensive from the territory of Manchuria according to plan, but were driven back by the 80th Infantry Regiment, which was covering the border.
On August 24 and 25 alone, SB bombers made 218 combat group sorties and dropped about 96 tons of bombs on the enemy. During these two days, fighters shot down about 70 Japanese aircraft in air battles.
On August 27, Soviet troops split the Japanese group into two parts and, despite the fanatical tenacity of the Yamato soldiers, by the morning of August 31, the resistance of the remnants of the 6th Army was suppressed. The Red Army captured about 200 guns, 100 vehicles, 400 machine guns, 12 thousand rifles and a lot of ammunition as trophies.
In September, senior teacher of the General Staff Academy A.I. was appointed chief of staff of the 1st Army Group. Gastilovich (following the Great Patriotic War - lieutenant general, commander of the 18th Army of the 4th Ukrainian Front). The reasons for Bogdanov's removal are not advertised. G.K. Zhukov does not mention him at all in his “Memoirs and Reflections”, getting off with the dry impersonal “chief of staff” - “the development of the plan for the general offensive at the headquarters of the army group was personally carried out by the commander, a member of the Military Council, the head of the political department, the chief of staff, the head of the operational department.” Perhaps a conflict occurred between the categorical corps commander, who sought, first of all, for unity of command in his army group, and his chief of staff, which, unlike the Cold War with Stern, escalated into an open phase, after which they decided to separate the opponents. Bogdanov's removal could have a more prosaic explanation, for example, due to injury or illness. Because the hero of Spain and Khalkhin Gol will not receive his next assignment very soon - only in December 1941 corps commander Bogdanov will receive the 461st Infantry Division.
The fighting ended only on September 16. During the entire battle, the losses of the Japanese side in killed, wounded and prisoners ranged from 61 to 67 thousand people, according to various estimates (of which about 25 thousand were irrevocable). Including about 45 thousand in July-August 1939. The Japanese lost a large amount of weapons and military equipment, lost 160 aircraft (according to other sources - up to 600).
The total losses of the Soviet-Mongolian troops ranged from 18.5 to 23 thousand, according to various estimates, 108 tanks and 207 aircraft. Of these, the losses of the Red Army: 6831 people were killed, 1143 were missing, 15,251 were wounded.
After the end of hostilities, Stalin received Zhukov and noted his actions by appointing him commander of the largest and most important military district - Kyiv. Thus, the “Hassan syndrome” of 1938, which cost the life of Marshal Blucher, was overcome in the military clash with Japan.
At a report by I.V. Stalin G.K. Zhukov assessed the imperial army opposing him as follows:
“The Japanese soldier is well trained, especially for close combat. Disciplined, efficient and tenacious in battle, especially defensively. The junior command staff is very well prepared and fights with fanatical tenacity. As a rule, junior commanders do not surrender and do not hesitate to face hara-kiri. The officers, especially senior and senior officers, are poorly trained, have little initiative and are inclined to act according to a template. As for the technical state of the Japanese army, I consider it backward. Japanese tanks like our MS-1 are clearly outdated, poorly armed and with a small power reserve. I must also say that at the beginning of the campaign, Japanese aircraft beat our aircraft. Their planes were superior to ours until we received the improved Chaika and I-16. Our artillery was superior to the Japanese in every respect, especially in shooting. In general, our troops are significantly higher than the Japanese. The Mongolian troops, having received experience, hardening and support from units of the Red Army, fought well, especially their armored division on Mount Bain-Tsagan. It must be said that the Mongol cavalry was sensitive to air raids and artillery fire and suffered heavy losses.”
G.M. Stern and G.K. Zhukov received the high title of Hero of the Soviet Union for the battles at Khalkhin Gol. In addition, in 1972, by the Decree of the Great People's Khural of the Mongolian People's Republic, Zhukov was awarded the title of Hero of the Mongolian People's Republic for his participation in the defeat of Japanese troops at Khalkhin Gol.
I'M IN. Smushkevich became Twice Hero of the Soviet Union.
Chief of Staff of the 1st Army Group, Brigade Commander M.A. Bogdanov did not receive any awards for Khalkhin Gol, and ended the Great Patriotic War as commander of the 8th Guards Airborne Division with the rank of major general. Some modern researchers believe that it was he who played a key role in the general encirclement and defeat of the Japanese troops, but there is no documentary evidence of this version. Bogdanov was noted as an excellent methodologist, an officer with a broad outlook and great knowledge. He personally supervised many tactical exercises, but upsurges of military thought similar to Khalkhin Gol can no longer be traced in his career.
At the beginning of hostilities in the area of the Khalkhin Gol River, Ivan Ivanovich Fedyuninsky held the position of assistant regiment commander for economic affairs, then headed the 24th Motorized Rifle Regiment. At the end of hostilities, I.I. Fedyuninsky was appointed commander of the 82nd division. In the first period of the Patriotic War, this division fought extremely stubbornly in the Mozhaisk direction. Major General Fedyuninsky successfully commanded the rifle corps on the Southwestern Front, and then the 42nd Army near Leningrad.
Divisional Commissioner M.S. Nikishev died in Ukraine at the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, where he was a member of the Military Council of the 5th Army of the Southwestern Front.
Brigade commander Mikhail Ivanovich Potapov, who led the main strike group on the southern flank of the army group, commanded the 5th Army of the Southwestern Front during the Great Patriotic War.
G.M. During the Finnish War, Stern commanded the 8th Army (in continuous heavy battles it inflicted serious losses on the Finns, most of all in artillery and aviation, but was unable to fully complete the task assigned to it by the main command), in 1940 he received the Order of the Red Star and the rank of Colonel General .
I'M IN. Smushkevich in 1940 received military rank Lieutenant General of Aviation, the position of Inspector General of the Red Army Air Force, and in December of the same year - Assistant Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army for Aviation.
October 28, 1941 G.M. Stern, Ya.V. Smushkevich, P.V. Rychagov and other high-ranking officers were shot on charges of participation in a military conspiratorial organization. The name of the army commander G.M. Stern was erased from textbooks, and Khalkhin Gol for a long time seemed to be the sole victory of G.K. Zhukova.
In 1954, those convicted in this case were posthumously rehabilitated with the wording “for lack of evidence of a crime.”
After Japan's defeat in this border conflict, Prince Konoe admitted to the German Ambassador Ott: “I realized that it will take another two years to achieve the level of technology, weapons and mechanization that the Red Army showed in the battles in the Khalkhin Gol region.” At the negotiations that took place after the end of the fighting, the representative of the Japanese command, General Fujimoto, told the chairman of the Soviet commission, Zhukov’s deputy, brigade commander Mikhail Potapov: “Yes, you have placed us very low...”
The Mongolian people warmly thanked the soldiers and commanders of the Red Army who protected them from Japanese aggression:
“On behalf of all the working people of Mongolia, we warmly welcome you, the defenders of our Motherland from the Japanese invaders, and congratulate you on the successful encirclement and complete defeat of the samurai who made their way to our land.
Our people will write in golden letters into the history of the struggle for their freedom and independence your heroic fight against the Japanese pack in the area of the Khalkhin Gol River. If it were not for your fraternal, selfless help, we would not have an independent Mongolian revolutionary state. If it were not for the help of the Soviet state, we would have faced the same fate as the people of Manchuria are experiencing. The Japanese invaders would have destroyed and plundered our land and the brotherhood of labor. This did not happen and will never happen, since the Soviet Union helps us and saves us from the Japanese invasion.
Thank you and thank you to the Soviet people!”
And this gratitude was not empty words. In 1941 alone, the Mongolian People's Republic received 140 carriages of various gifts for Soviet soldiers totaling 65 million tugriks. Vneshtorgbank received 2 million 500 thousand tugriks and 100 thousand American dollars, 300 kilograms of gold. 53 tanks were built, of which 32 were T-34 tanks, on the sides of which were the glorious names of Sukhbaatar and other heroes of the MPR. Many of these tanks reached Berlin as part of the 112th Tank Brigade of the 1st Guards Tank Army.
In addition to tanks, the Mongolian Arat aviation squadron was transferred to the Soviet Air Force. She became part of the 2nd Orsha Guards Aviation Regiment. The Mongolian Arat squadron carried out a victorious battle path throughout the war. In 1941-42, 35 thousand horses were donated to the Red Army, which were used to equip Soviet cavalry units.
When in 1945 the Soviet government, in accordance with an agreement with its allies in the anti-Hitler coalition, declared war on Japan, the Mongolian army, led personally by H. Choibalsan and Y. Tsedenbal, acted on the right wing of the Soviet troops, as part of the Soviet-Mongolian cavalry mechanized group under the command of General I. A. Pliev.
For skillful leadership of military operations, Marshal of the MPR X. Choibalsan was awarded the Order of Suvorov, 1st degree, and Yu. Tsedenbal was awarded the Order of Kutuzov, 1st degree. 26 people were awarded the Order of the Red Banner, the Order of Glory II degree - 13 people, the medal "For Courage" - 82 people.
The successful completion of military operations at Lake Khasan and on the Khalkhin Gol River on the eve of the Second World War saved the USSR from the serious threat of a war on two fronts.
2010-11-22 at 15:12
Life is good!
Thanks for the article, interesting
2010-11-22 at 15:33
"You can beg for anything! Money, fame, power, but not your Motherland... Especially one like my Russia"
2010-11-22 at 16:15
On January 12, 1918, the Japanese battleship Iwami appeared in the Vladivostok roadstead. Two days later they entered the Golden Horn Bay Japanese cruiser"Asahi" and the English cruiser "Suffolk".The Japanese consul in Vladivostok hastened to assure local authorities that the warships had arrived to protect Japanese citizens living there. The need for such protection was proven quite quickly. On April 4, in Vladivostok, unknown persons killed two Japanese, employees of the local branch of one of the Japanese companies. The very next morning, a Japanese military force landed in Vladivostok. Thus began open military intervention in Far East Soviet Russia.
However, at the first stage, military operations were carried out by detachments of White Guards under the leadership of atamans Semenov, Kalmykov and Gamov, armed with money from Japan and the United States. The uprising of the Czechoslovak legionnaires, who captured a number of cities in Siberia and the Far East along the Trans-Siberian Railway, also played into the hands of the interventionists. On August 2, 1918, the Japanese government announced that it would send troops to Vladivostok to provide assistance Czechoslovak corps. On the same day, Japanese troops captured Nikolaevsk-on-Amur, where there were no Czech legionnaires. Soon American, British and French troops began to land in Vladivostok. The joint expeditionary force of interventionists was led by the Japanese General Otani.
By the beginning of October 1918, the number of Japanese troops in the Russian Far East reached 70 thousand people. They captured railways and ships of the Amur Flotilla, gradually expanding the occupation zone. Meanwhile, the situation in Japan itself was very alarming. In August 1918, “rice riots” broke out in the country. By this time, the contrast between the speculators who had profited during the war years and the poor people of the city and village, who had lost the opportunity to make ends meet, had become especially striking. But government officials continued to rake out the remaining grain from peasant barns for the needs of the army. In addition, a considerable number of recruits were needed to be sent to Russia. The anger of the masses has reached its limit.
In the ranks of the Japanese Expeditionary Force, cases of soldiers disobeying officers became more frequent, soldier riots occurred, and there were cases of Japanese military personnel defecting to the side of the Red Army and partisans. Anti-war propaganda among the troops was carried out by Japanese socialists and communists.
In February-May 1920, events occurred in Nikolaevsk-on-Amur that were used to justify the intervention and its expansion. The city, occupied by Japanese troops, was besieged by a red partisan detachment. On February 28, as a result of negotiations, an agreement “On Peace and Friendship between the Japanese and Russians” was concluded, according to which the partisans peacefully entered the city. However, on March 12, an armed conflict began. As a result, the Japanese were defeated, and some of them were captured. A month later, a large Japanese contingent was sent to Nikolaevsk. During the retreat, the commander of the partisan detachment ordered the shooting of all prisoners (including the Japanese), as well as all residents who refused to leave the city with him.
Japanese troops occupied Northern Sakhalin, justifying this by the need to “pay for the blood” of Japanese soldiers who died during the intervention.
The brutal civil war in European Russia tied the hands of the government in Moscow. Unable to openly oppose intervention in the Far East, it proposed in April 1920 the creation of a democratic Far Eastern Republic (FER) as a buffer state between the RSFSR and Japan. The Far Eastern Republic united the entire Russian territory from Vladivostok to Lake Baikal. The Japanese refused to recognize the government of the Far Eastern Republic and continued to provide assistance to Ataman Semenov, who kept Chita under his control.
But the Japanese troops failed to stay in Transbaikalia. Under the blows of the People's Revolutionary Army, they were forced to retreat to Khabarovsk. In August 1920, the Japanese government sent an order to the headquarters of its expeditionary force in Siberia, which stated: " General position in Europe, victories of Soviet armies on the Polish front, increasing danger from the Soviet government, perceived antipathy from the United States and China<…>are forcing us to abandon our occupation plans in Siberia for some time, remaining, however, in the places where our troops are located."
The occupied zone of the Far East continued to shrink steadily. In October 1920, the Japanese left Khabarovsk. Together with the White Guards, they organized armed coups in a number of cities in Primorye, trying to wrest power from the hands of the government of the Far Eastern Republic. A pro-Japanese government of the Merkulov brothers was formed in Vladivostok. At the same time, attempts were made with the help of the White Guard formations of Ataman Semenov, General Sychev, and Baron Ungern to return to the Amur region and Transbaikalia. These plans could not be realized, and Japan was forced to enter into peace negotiations with the government of the Far Eastern Republic. In August 1921, in Dairen, the Japanese presented representatives of the Far Eastern Republic with a draft agreement, which in its nature was reminiscent of the ultimatum “21 demands” to China of 1915. Among other points in the agreement were demands to grant Japanese subjects the right to own land, develop mining and forestry industries and complete freedom trade, as well as freedom of navigation of Japanese ships along the Amur and in coastal waters, to turn Vladivostok into a “free port” under foreign control. Finally, Japan demanded that, as compensation for losses incurred during the intervention, the northern part of Sakhalin Island be leased for 80 years.
These demands met a decisive rebuff from the government of the Far Eastern Republic, and in April 1922, the Dairen Conference, which had lasted for nine months, was interrupted. The Japanese, with the help of the White Guards, reoccupied Khabarovsk. The People's Revolutionary Army, together with the partisans, went on the offensive. After a decisive battle on February 12 near Volochaevka, the Whites rolled back south under the protection of Japanese bayonets. The government of the Merkulov brothers resigned. The former Kolchak General Diterikhs became the “ruler”. But this could no longer change the course of events. On August 15, 1922, the Japanese military command announced the upcoming evacuation from Primorye.
In September 1922, a new peace conference was opened in Changchun, China, designed to regulate relations between the Far Eastern Republic and Japan. The Japanese again offered the Russians a slightly modernized, but absolutely unacceptable version of the Dairen project, while at the same time refusing to document the timing of the withdrawal of their troops from Northern Sakhalin. After three weeks of fruitless debate, the conference ended inconclusively.
In October, the People's Revolutionary Army of the Far Eastern Republic resumed its offensive against the White Guards, defeated Diterikhs's detachments and, having stormed the Spassk fortifications, approached Vladivostok. It was impossible to wait any longer, and the Japanese command announced the withdrawal of its troops from Primorye on October 25, 1922. On this day, the partisans occupied Vladivostok, and already on November 15, 1922, the All-Russian Central Executive Committee declared the Far Eastern Republic integral part RSFSR. The intervention ended in complete failure. But the Japanese remained in Northern Sakhalin, from where they left only in 1925, after the establishment of diplomatic relations with the USSR. The march of the Japanese army at Vladivostok city.
The Illustration of the Siberian War, no. 3.
The battle of Usri, Siberia. Captain Konomi died in the battle, fighting.
The Illustration of the Siberian War, no. 4.
The Japanese army defeated the German-Austrian Army near Usri, Siberia.
The Illustration of the Siberian War, no. 5.
The first battle near Manturia. The Japanese soldiers defeated the enemy's cavalry.
The Illustration of the Siberian War, no. 6.
The brilliant exploit of the Noshido(?) Infantry Company destroyed rail road, going around the back of the ememy.
The Illustration of the Siberian War, no. 7.
The Japanese cavalry taken possession of Khobarovsk pursuing and attacking the enemies.
The Illustration of the Siberian War, no. 8.
The Japanese cavalry advanced furiously in storm.
The Illustration of the Siberian War, no. 9.
The Japanese army occupied Habalofsk -- Amur Fleet surrendered.
The Illustration of the Siberian War, no. 10.
Furious fighting at Amur.
Bogdanov Mikhail Vasilievich
Brigade commander of the Red Army.
Major General of the Armed Forces KONR.
Born in 1897.
Brigade commander, chief of artillery of the 8th Rifle Corps.
Russian. Non-partisan.
In the Red Army - since 1919.
Awarded the medal "XX Years of the Red Army".
After passing through several prison camps, Bogdanov was sent to Hummelsburg on April 6, 1942, to Oflag XIII-D.
Having accepted the offer of a representative of the German command, Bogdanov began working in the “historical office”, collecting and summarizing everything written about the military operations of the Southwestern Front up to the Kyiv operation.
On November 5, 1941, representatives of the military construction organization TODT, which was engaged in recruiting specialists from among prisoners of war, arrived in Oflag XIII-D.
On November 18, Bogdanov was sent to the town of Schlachtensee, near Berlin. A month later he was transferred to Borisov and appointed head of the educational unit of the “Higher Russian-German School of Specialists,” which trained workers in the rear services of the German army.
Here, in June 1943, Bogdanov was recruited by a man who called himself State Security Major Ivan Grigorievich Pastukhov. He offered Bogdanov a special task - to infiltrate the ROA and try to physically destroy or discredit Vlasov, and then take over the leadership of the ROA. Bogdanov signed an agreement to cooperate and received the pseudonym Gvozdev.
On August 30, 1943, Bogdanov, while on a business trip in Berlin, met with Vlasov, who knew him well from his joint service.
In the fall of 1943, Bogdanov became deputy head of the department of the TODT organization, which operated under Army Group Center and was called Volga.
In October 1943, due to numerous escapes of trained workers, the department was disbanded. Bogdanov, either intending to carry out the instructions of state security major Pastukhov, or fearing that he would be returned to a prisoner of war camp, turned to Vlasov with a request to enroll in the ROA.
On November 20, 1943, Bogdanov was enrolled in the “officer reserve” of the propagandist school with a salary in the 16th category - 10 marks per decade, like an ordinary soldier.
However, already in December, Bogdanov was included in the “inspection group” commanded by Blagoveshchensky.
After several inspection trips to prisoner-of-war camps, Bogdanov was appointed head of the artillery department of the KONR headquarters at the end of December 1944.
On December 1, 1943, Bogdanov was awarded the rank of Major General of the ROA with the right to wear German insignia.
In 1945, Bogdanov again contacted the partisans, informing them about the upcoming movement of ROA units through Czechoslovakia.
Already in Czechoslovakia, he forwarded a letter to the partisans in which he asked to take him away. After some time they came for him.
From the book In the Name of the Motherland. Stories about Chelyabinsk residents - Heroes and twice Heroes of the Soviet Union author Ushakov Alexander ProkopyevichGRESHILOV Mikhail Vasilievich Mikhail Vasilyevich Greshilov was born in 1912 in the village of Budenovka, Zolotukhinsky district, Kursk region, into a peasant family. Russian. In 1929, he came to Magnitostroy with a group of Komsomol members. Graduated from FZU (now SGPTU-19). Worked as an electrician at
From the book Army Officer Corps by Lieutenant General A.A. Vlasov 1944-1945 author Alexandrov Kirill MikhailovichEGOROV (Rumyantsev) Mikhail Vasilyevich Major of the Red Army, Lieutenant Colonel of the Armed Forces of the Korr, Born in 1900 in the village of Lapulovo, Kuzemsky volost, Yaroslavl province. Russian. From peasants. Non-partisan. In the Red Army since 1919. In June 1941, he served as head of the logistics department of the headquarters of the 3rd
From the book Communists author Kunetskaya Lyudmila IvanovnaTARNOVSKY Mikhail Vasilievich Major of the Air Force KONR Born in 1907 in Tsarskoe Selo near St. Petersburg. Russian. From the family of Russian Army Colonel V.V. Tarnovsky. On November 14, 1920, he and his family were evacuated from Crimea. In 1921–1922 lived with his family in France, from 1922 - in
From the book People and Explosions author Tsukerman Veniamin AronovichMikhail Vasilyevich Frunze Born on January 21 (February 2), 1885 in the city of Pishpek (now the city of Frunze - the capital of the Kirghiz SSR), in the family of a paramedic. He graduated from high school, in 1904 he entered the St. Petersburg Polytechnic Institute, carried out revolutionary work among the workers and
From the book 22 deaths, 63 versions author Lurie Lev YakovlevichMIKHAIL VASILIEVICH DMITRIEV Broad-shouldered, tall, well-built, with a courageous open face, he was a favorite of the employees not only of ours, but also of other departments. The eyes looked at the interlocutor seriously and kindly. And at the same time, in these eyes, somewhere in
From the book The Most Closed People. From Lenin to Gorbachev: Encyclopedia of Biographies author Zenkovich Nikolay AlexandrovichMikhail Vasilyevich Frunze Early autumn 1925. Through the woods of the Moscow region, the letter train of the Chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic, Mikhail Frunze, rushes to the capital. The legendary army commander, the winner of Wrangel, was urgently summoned to the capital. It's not about politics. Not a military threat.
author Konyaev Nikolay MikhailovichZIMYANIN Mikhail Vasilievich (11/21/1914 - 05/01/1995). Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee from 03/05/1976 to 01/28/1987. Member of the CPSU Central Committee in 1952 - 1956, 1966 - 1989. Member of the Central Committee of the CPSU in 1956 - 1966. Party member since 1939. Born in Vitebsk into a working-class family. Belarusian. He began his career in 1929 as a worker at a locomotive repair depot.
From the book General from the Mire. The fate and history of Andrei Vlasov. Anatomy of Betrayal author Konyaev Nikolay MikhailovichFRUNZE Mikhail Vasilievich (02/04/1885 - 10/31/1925). Candidate member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) from 02.06.1924 to 31.10.1925 Candidate member of the Organizing Bureau of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) from 02.06.1924 to 31.10.1925 Member of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) in 1921 - 1925 Member of the party since 1904. Born in the city of Pishpek (in Soviet times Frunze, now Bishkek) Semirechenskaya
From the book Silver Age. Portrait gallery of cultural heroes of the turn of the 19th–20th centuries. Volume 2. K-R author Fokin Pavel Evgenievich From the book Silver Age. Portrait gallery of cultural heroes of the turn of the 19th–20th centuries. Volume 3. S-Y author Fokin Pavel EvgenievichBogdanov Mikhail Vasilyevich Brigade Commander of the Red Army. Major General of the Armed Forces of the KONR. Born in 1897. Brigade commander, chief of artillery of the 8th Rifle Corps. Russian. Non-party member. In the Red Army - since 1919. Awarded the medal “XX Years of the Red Army”. On August 5, 1941, the 8th Rifle Corps fell into
From the book Great Chemists. In 2 volumes. T.I. author Manolov KaloyanLE-DANTU (Ledantu) Mikhail Vasilievich 27.1 (8.2).1891 – 25.8 (7.9).1917 Painter, theater artist, author of works on the theory of painting. Student of Ya. Tsionglinsky. Member of the Youth Union group, participated in the exhibitions “Donkey’s Tail” (1912), “Target” (1913), “No. 4” (1914). “Into a dimly lit room
From the book Golden Stars of Kurgan author Ustyuzhanin Gennady PavlovichMATYUSHIN Mikhail Vasilievich 1861 – 10/14/1934 Artist, musician, writer, teacher. After graduating from the conservatory, in 1881–1913 he was the “first violin” of the imperial orchestra in St. Petersburg. Student of M. Dobuzhinsky and L. Bakst. Together with his wife E. Guro, he founded the publishing house “Crane” (1909–1917). One
From the author's bookNESTEROV Mikhail Vasilievich 19(31).5.1862 – 18.10.1942Painter. Paintings “The Hermit” (1888), “Vision to the Youth Bartholomew” (1889–1890), “Under the Good News” (1895), triptych “The Life of Sergius of Radonezh”, “Holy Rus'” (1901–1906), “In Rus'” ( 1916), “Philosophers” (1917), etc. He took part in the painting
From the author's book From the author's bookMIKHAIL VASILIEVICH LOMONOSOV (1711–1765) Gray clouds hanging over the sea suddenly rushed rapidly. It was as if a ferocious predator suddenly attacked a flock of birds flying to the south. “There will be a storm,” said the bearded Pomeranian and leaned on the oars. The fishing boat rushed forward. - Others too
From the author's bookKONOVALOV Mikhail Vasilievich Mikhail Vasilyevich Konovalov was born in 1919 in the village of Yasnaya Polyana, Dalmatovsky district, Kurgan region, into a peasant family. Russian by nationality. Candidate member of the CPSU. After graduating from school, he worked on a collective farm as an accountant, then
Mikhail Andreevich Bogdanov(December 8, 1898 - May 27, 1969) - Soviet military leader, major general (1942).
Biography
Born on December 8, 1898 in the city of St. Petersburg in a working-class family. At the age of 13 he began working at city enterprises. Drafted into the tsarist army at the end of the First World War. Participated in the storming of the Winter Palace in 1917. During the Civil War he commanded a squad and platoon.
In the 1920s, M. A. Bogdanov held various command and staff positions in the Red Army. Then he entered the military academy named after M.V. Frunze, which he successfully completed in the early 1930s. After studying, he held the positions of chief of the operations department of a rifle division, chief of staff of a division and head of the operations department of the headquarters of a rifle corps. Commanded a rifle division in the Belarusian Military District.
During the Spanish Civil War, Colonel M.A. Bogdanov, who knew Spanish, was in Spain as a military adviser to a brigade, division, and headquarters of the Valencia sector of the front, for which he was awarded the Order of Lenin in 1938.
Battles at Khalkhin Gol
At the height of the fighting at Khalkhin Gol, brigade commander M.A. Bogdanov, as chief of staff, joined the Military Council of the 1st Army Group, formed in accordance with the resolution of the Main Military Council of July 15, 1939 to prepare for the counter-offensive of the Soviet troops. M.A. Bogdanov participated in the development of the operation plan and, according to the BBC radio station, played a key role in the general encirclement and defeat of the Japanese troops. At the end of hostilities in September 1939, by order of the USSR NKO, he was appointed deputy commander of the 1st Army Group (Ulaanbaatar). In the same month, by Decree of the Government of the USSR, he was appointed chairman of the Soviet-Mongolian delegation to the Mixed Commission to resolve controversial issues regarding the state border between the Mongolian People's Republic and Manchuria in the conflict area. At the end of the negotiations, as a result of provocation from the Japanese side, M. A. Bogdanov made “a grave mistake that damaged the prestige of the USSR,” for which he was put on trial. On March 1, 1940, he was convicted by the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR under Art. 193-17 paragraph “a” for 4 years of labor camp. By a resolution of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of August 23, 1941, he was amnestied with his criminal record expunged and placed at the disposal of NGOs of the USSR.
Awarded the Order of the Red Banner by decree of November 17, 1939 (Published in the newspaper "Red Star" on November 18, 1939):
On awarding orders and medals of the USSR to commanding personnel, Red Army soldiers of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army and border guards, family members of commanding personnel and hospital workers.
For exemplary fulfillment of the Government's combat missions and the valor and courage demonstrated at the same time, award: Order of the Red Banner
“……No. 269. Brigade commander Bogdanov Mikhail Andreevich.....”
Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR M. KALININ.
Secretary of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR A. GORKIN.
Also awarded the Order of the Red Banner of the Mongolian People's Republic.
Great Patriotic War
On August 23, 1941, he was amnestied with the removal of his criminal record and the return of awards. Restored to his previous rank of “brigade commander” (because at the time of the introduction of the general ranks he was in prison and did not undergo recertification). From December 22, 1941 to January 4, 1943 - commander of the 461st Infantry Division (reformed into the 69th Infantry Division). After being transferred to the front, the division held the defense in the Smolensk region.
On January 1, 1943, at the division's site, German troops launched an unexpected artillery attack and attack, took prisoners, occupied the first trench, and only by noon did Soviet troops restore the situation. As a result, regimental and battalion commanders were deprived of awards and titles, division commander M.A. Bogdanov was removed from his post, and on the same day the division was replaced at the front line by another and moved 15 kilometers to the rear.
I remember that Boris Sokolov once came across the following passage in his “antibiography” “Unknown Zhukov”:
“The role of the chief of staff of the 1st Army Group, brigade commander M.V. Bogdanov, in the development of the plan for the attack on Khalkhin Gol is completely unclear. It seems very reasonable to assume that his relationship with Zhukov did not work out. Bogdanov did not receive any awards for Khalkhin Gol, in the generals did not produce him before the start of the Great Patriotic War. Bogdanov’s further fate was tragic. He was captured, joined the Russian Liberation Army of General Vlasov, and was the chief of artillery there. Soviet intelligence established contact with him, as if to atone for his guilt. organize an assassination attempt on Vlasov, but the Soviet contacts did not come to him again. After the war, Bogdanov was shot. At first they thought to try him along with Vlasov and other leaders of the ROA, but then they changed their minds, and quietly, without publication in the press, they executed him in the same 1946." .
And here it’s hard to disagree: the role of brigade commander M.V. (!) Bogdanov in developing the plan for the operation on Khalkhin Gol is completely unclear. Or rather, M.V. mentioned here. Bogdanov never had the slightest connection either with Khalkhin Gol or with the staff work. Since he was an artilleryman all the way, by the beginning of the war he was the chief of artillery of the 8th Rifle Corps of the 26th Army, was captured, collaborated with the Germans, and became one of the main figures of the ROA (where he actually headed the same artillery). Actually, it is for this reason that his biography is covered somewhat better than the biographies of thousands of other officers who had the rank of brigade commander at the beginning of the war, but were not captured and did not become “famous” for their collaboration with the Germans (however, let’s leave moral assessments aside).
So, since I imagined the situation in the ROA, it was immediately obvious to me that B. Sokolov simply confused the two brigade commanders Bogdanovs (still, it is harmful, when conducting historical research, to get too carried away with “literally beautiful” plot twists).
No, Khalkingol Bogdanov - he was different. Mikhail Andreevich Bogdanov. And although he then bore the modest rank of brigade commander, it is difficult to call him an “ordinary” brigade commander. Because the chief of staff of the only powerful fighting group of the Red Army at that time was an extraordinary position. And since he was the chief of staff all the way, and in general the operation was very successful - whatever his relationship with Zhukov (at that time - still far from such an influential figure as a little later), it could be expected that Bogdanov after such a triumph awaited elevation (which, of course, did not exclude subsequent repressions as a result of one or another showdown, as happened, say, with Stern).
However, with Bogdanov, it seems, neither one nor the other worked out. And he did not become either a glorified hero or an “enemy of the people.” In general, it was as if this Khalkhingol episode flew past him, where he took a very direct part in the key role.
However, even before Sokolov, I remember one passage from “Shadow of Victory” by V. Suvorov, which contains some vague hint that even before Khalkhin Gol this same Bogdanov M.A. - was known in certain circles and did not even seem to need to inflate his fame:
“It was not in vain that Marshal Zakharov spoke about the chief of staff of the 1st Army Group, and it was not at all by chance that he did this in 1970. This is what lies behind this. In 1969, Zhukov’s memoirs were published. The name of the chief of staff of the 1st Army Group Zhukov is why - he didn’t. And then other marshals, not only Zakharov, began to remind Zhukov: don’t forget who your chief of staff was! Your operation on Khalkhin Gol was planned by Bogdanov himself!
Here it was time to be puzzled: “And who is Bogdanov, exactly? And even Bogdanov HIMSELF? Okay, “the chief of staff was Vasilevsky/Antonov/Vatutin HIMSELF.” But Bogdanov - what was he famous for then? Or, let’s pose the question differently to another: and what did he become famous for a little later, two years later, when other staff officers who started the war as colonels ended it as marshals? And, say, “Baghramyan himself” - I would also understand. But “Bogdanov himself”?
I wanted to ask: “Uncle Vitya! What you just said, by the way, is very interesting. This is much more interesting than your discussions about highway tanks. And this is - what, echoes of some conversations in the General Staff of the seventies, where the name M.A. .Bogdanov was known to everyone, and his competence was not questioned. But why do we know nothing, or almost nothing, about “Bogdanov himself”?
And at one time I decided, as best I could, to fill this gap for myself. At least track M.A.’s path. Bogdanov after Khalkhin Gol according to available sources. At the same time, I proceeded from the fact that although there were many generals in the Red Army with the surname Bogdanov, which leads to confusion, Mikhail Andreevich, with a high probability, is the same person.
So here's what happened. In the years between the wars, brigade commander Bogdanov, the humble creator of the victory at Khalkhin Gol, did not seem to shine at all. But, it seems, he was not repressed. In any case, I did not find his name on the lists of those imprisoned or dismissed. There are no mentions anywhere at all.
This name appears again - only in December 1941. Namely, on December 22, Brigade Commander Bogdanov became the commander of the 461st Infantry Division, newly formed in the Central Asian Military District, in Tashkent (where, as one can assume, he served after Khalkhin Gol; well, although this is not a determining factor for the movements of officers, but - geographically close).
And this is really strange. Whatever Zhukov’s attitude towards Bogdanov (there is evidence that they knew each other before Khalkhin Gol from Slutsk) - with the beginning of the war such an experienced worker could count on something more than the position of commander of a banal rifle division. The chief of staff of the army - at least. After all, in the end, Zhukov also had a VERY difficult relationship with Rokossovsky in the thirties (and after), and he really was imprisoned. But on the eve of the war, having released him, he was still assigned not to the rifle division, but to the 9th mechanized corps.
Further, the 461st division very soon, on 02/14/42, was renamed the 69th Infantry Division. True, we managed to find a mention of the General Staff directive dated January 27, 1942, where this division from Tashkent already appears under this number. But this is particular. What is more important - obviously, from this moment, with the redeployment from Central Asia to the Volga District - the combat path of this formation begins(?).
Unfortunately, information about him is rather fragmentary. Judging by this table, from May 42nd it was transferred from the reserve of the VSGC to the 50th Army (Boldin, the same one). Specifically, the subordination of the formation can be tracked using this table. Well, the actions of the 50th Army under Boldin after the defense of Tula and the capture of Kaluga, the entire 42nd year was a Rzhev-Vyazemsk meat grinder, where it was difficult to gain glory.
But in March 1943, the division was transferred to the 65th Army (Batov, also the same one). And then the rewards started pouring in. Brief list of awards
From the order assigning the honorary name "Sevskaya" it follows that in August-September it participated in the Chernigov-Pripyat operation of the Central Front as part of the 65th Army (Batov). But it became Red Banner on July 21, i.e., during the repulsion of a German attack on the 65th Army from the Sevsk area.
However, Bogdanov commands the division only until 01/04/43. Where does he go from there, after the obviously not very successful actions of the Central and Western Fronts in 1942 around “Mars”? Probably against the background in general unsuccessful operations the central Soviet group, just M.A. Bogdanov was not blamed for this. Because he appears again - as commander, from 12/29/44, of the 107th Guards Rifle Division. Created on the basis of not just anything, but the 8th Guards Airborne Division.
In this capacity, the 107th Guards became part of the 9th Guards Army and, apparently, quite successfully participated in the victorious Prague and Vienna operations. It’s strange, but Bogdanov ended the war as a major general, which rank was awarded to him only in October 1942 instead of brigade commander, and he was removed from the post of division commander-107 on May 11, 1945. After that, I couldn’t find any information about him.
However, even during the war years itself, the career of M.A. Bogdanov - there seems to be a gap of almost two years. And two questions remain not entirely clear: 1) who commanded the 8th Guards. Airborne Division in the 43rd and 44th; 2) where Bogdanov was at that time.
That is, it is known that when in December the 42nd Airborne Forces were “transformed” into the Guards Airborne Division, the 8th, created on the basis of the 10th Airborne Forces, was headed by the former corps commander, Major General A.G. Kapitokhin. In December 1944, the 8th Airborne Division was transferred to Kirzhach, where it was turned into the 107th Guards. SD, whose commander has been Bogdanov since December 29, 1944.
Unfortunately, I was unable to find a chronology of the commanders of the 8th Guards Airborne Division in open sources (it’s easier with riflemen). But one short note caught my eye. Where are these words:
“All these formations were in a hurry to the Southern Bug and were preparing to cross it. The 8th Guards Airborne Division tried to carry out this task on March 23 (1944 - A.F.) near the village of Konstantinovka, but the stormy current carried away small rafts and other floating craft. Then the division commander, Major General M.A. Bogdanov, ordered to concentrate in the village of Semenovka...”
That is, already in March 1944, the division was commanded not by Kapitokhin, but by Bogdanov. However, it’s understandable that it’s not Kapitokhin. Since A.G. Kapitokhin became commander of the Airborne Forces as a whole back in June 1943.
Honestly, I’m not ready to go into the archives now, look at orders for the 461st Infantry Division, 69th Infantry Division, 8th Guards. Airborne Division, 107th Guards. SD and conduct a full-fledged historical research regarding the path of brigade commander/Major General M.A. Bogdanov during the Second World War. I'm not a historian at all.
In June 1939, there was some calm at Khalkhin Gol, which was accompanied only by air battles.
The May battles revealed the weaknesses of the Red Army's defense and the inability to quickly and quickly defeat the enemy and drive him out of the territory of Mongolia, which forced the USSR leadership to push new units and new people into the hotbed of war.
The 11th tank brigade traveled 800 km (!) and arrived at the scene almost simultaneously with the arriving commanders from the capital.
INSPECTOR AND COMMANDER 57-OK
The 57th Special Corps was of key importance in the confrontation with the Japanese. The question arose about the need to inspect the corps and who would conduct this inspection.
S. M. Budyonny proposed to replace inspector G. K. Zhukov, who knew him very well from his service in the Red Army Cavalry Inspectorate in Moscow in the early 1930s; Zhukov, in particular, was the commander of Budyonny’s favorite cavalry unit.
Stalin responded to Budyonny’s proposal a little skeptically:
“Who is this? Why don’t I know?”
Budyonny briefly described Zhukov to Stalin, then Semyon Mikhailovich called Zhukov
“a commander with strong strong-willed qualities, very demanding of himself and his subordinates, in the latter case there is excessive rudeness.”
Apparently, it was considered necessary to “shake up” the commanders in the 57th Special Corps, remote from the capitals and lost in the steppes of Mongolia.
Budyonny also noted that Zhukov
“the sense of responsibility for the assigned work is highly developed.”
Stalin eventually agreed, saying that “we’ll see.”...
It seems that Semyon Mikhailovich was able to discern in the young Red commander qualities of character that were much more important than knowledge of the specifics of any theater of military operations - the ability to command and strength of character.
For now, Zhukov was sent in the role of a demanding inspector who would not delve into banquets with those being inspected.
It was precisely for the purpose of checking the condition of the 57th Corps that on May 29, 1939, Divisional Commander Zhukov, together with Brigade Commander Denisov and Regimental Commissar Chernyshev, flew to Mongolia.
When G. Zhukov arrived at the headquarters of the 57th Special Corps in Tamtsag-Bulak, a conversation took place between him and the corps commander.
A check of the condition of the troops and the outcome of the May battles revealed the inability of the commander of the 57th Special Corps, Feklenko, and revealed the need for his replacement; as a result, the commander of the corps, N.V. Feklenko, was removed with the wording:
“Poorly understands the nature of combat operations in the specific conditions of the desert steppe.”
Thus ended Feklenko’s command.
HOW WE SOLVED THE ISSUE WITH THE NEW COMMANDER
One of the oddities of Khalkhin Gol is the very appointment of Zhukov to the post of commander of 57-OK
At the time of his dispatch to Mongolia, Divisional Commander Zhukov served as deputy commander of the Belarusian Military District for cavalry. He was appointed to this position in June 1938, and before that he commanded a cavalry division and a cavalry corps in the same Belarusian Military District.
To assume that Georgy Konstantinovich, over the course of several years of service in Belarus, acquired invaluable experience in operating in deserts and steppes would be madness.
Having served in Mongolia since 1936, Feklenko knew the theater of military operations much better. A more suitable candidate in comparison with Zhukov was, for example, the one who served in 1930 - 1933. in Turkestan cavalryman D.I. Ryabyshev.
In the end, it was possible to return I.S. to the post of first commander of the special corps in Mongolia. Koneva. He had been familiar with the Far Eastern theater of operations since the Civil War.
In addition, the appointment of cavalryman Zhukov to Mongolia was in itself strange.
In the 57th Special Corps there was only a relatively small number of Mongol cavalry, and the backbone of the Soviet troops consisted of mechanized units and formations on tanks and armored cars, Motorized armored brigades as organizational structures were unique to the Red Army and existed only as part of the corps in Mongolia.
If in other districts armored cars were used in reconnaissance units, then in Mongolia brigades of 57 medium and 25 light armored cars, a motorized infantry battalion and an artillery division were created. Having completed advanced training courses for command personnel at the Academy of Motorization and Mechanization, Feklenko was theoretically a more suitable candidate for commanding such troops.
Moreover, since 1936 he was the commander of the 7th motorized armored brigade of the 57th corps and could study the capabilities of this motorized mechanized formation, unique in Soviet and even world practice.
If the command was not satisfied with Feklenko personally, then it was possible to select one of the tank commanders.
Thus, it becomes clear that Zhukov was theoretically not an equivalent replacement for Feklenko. The task of changing the corps commander was not initially even set. G.K. Zhukov was sent to Mongolia not to command the corps, but for the purpose
"checking the condition and combat readiness of units of the 57th separate corps"
That is, he was not considered for the post of commander of 57-OK when he was sent to the corps. But he still became one, beating out more preferable candidates.
How and why?
We are unlikely to ever find out, but most likely USSR Marshal S.M. Budyonny put in a good word for him here too.
By order of the top, the 57th Special Corps, allocated to repel the attack, was significantly strengthened, and divisional commander G.K. Zhukov was appointed its commander.
It would not be an exaggeration to say that it was from this moment that his ascent to the heights of military glory began.
The command staff of the 1st Army Group (from left to right): Corporal Commander N.I. Biryukov, Air Force Commander Ya.V. Smushkevich, Commander of the 1st Army Group G.K. Zhukov, Divisional Commissioner M.S. Nikishev, Army Commander G. M. Stern and corps commander N.N. Voronov.
NEW REORGANIZATION
On July 5, the Main Military Council of the Red Army decided to form a new body for the strategic leadership of the Armed Forces in Chita, subordinating to it all the troops stationed at that time in the Far East.
In accordance with this, the People's Commissar of Defense issued an order to create a front-line group of troops led by the commander - Army Commander 2nd Rank G. M. Stern.
The improvement of control bodies in the Far Eastern theater of operations ended in mid-July 1939 with the transformation of the 57th Special Corps into the 1st Army Group under the command of Divisional Commander G.K. Zhukov, with its subordination directly to the commander of the front group of forces in the Far East.
G.M.Stern
From the Memoirs of Vasilevsky A.M. :
“During the events at Khalkhin Gol in 1939, as is known, the Soviet command created the 1st Army Group from Soviet and Mongolian troops under the control of Corps Corps G.K. Zhukov, and to coordinate the actions of these troops on the basis of the Transbaikal District it was formed front group under the command of Army Commander 2nd Rank G. M. Stern.
The government and the People's Commissar of Defense attached great importance to his timely arrival from Moscow to Mongolia, the area of military operations.
The organization of the flight was entrusted to the General Staff, and direct and hourly monitoring of the flight was entrusted by the Chief of the General Staff to the temporary acting head of the Operations Directorate V.D. Ivanov.
Using Ivanov’s information, B.M. Shaposhnikov periodically reported on the progress of the flight to the government and I.V. Stalin. On the appointed day and hour, Stern flew to Chita in order to immediately fly to the final destination, which required only less than an hour of time."
Brigade commander M. Bogdanov.
Commissioner of Khalkhin-Gol N. Biryukov
Zakharov M.V. in his work “GENERAL STAFF IN THE PRE-WAR YEARS” he wrote the following:
“Later, in order to strengthen the leadership of the troops located on the territory of the MPR, in accordance with the resolution of the Main Military Council of July 15, 1939, the 57th Special Corps was reorganized into the 1st Army Group (108). G. K was appointed commander of the group Zhukov, member of the Military Council - divisional commissar M. S. Nikishev, chief of staff - brigade commander M. A. Bogdanov.
The group included the 82nd, 36th and 57th rifle divisions, the 6th and 11th tank brigades, the 7th, 8th and 9th armored brigades, the 191st, 192nd and 193rd separate rifle battalions, the 6th and 8th I cavalry divisions of the MPR and other units.
During the period of hostilities in the area of the Khalkhin Gol River, in accordance with the resolution of the Main Military Council of July 5, 1939, to unite and direct the actions of the 1st and 2nd Separate Red Banner Armies and the 57th Special Corps (later the 1st Army Group ) a front-line group was created, which was entrusted with the functions of front-line control with the task of coordinating the actions of Soviet and Mongolian troops.
G. M. Stern was appointed commander of the front group, divisional commissar N. I. Biryukov was appointed member of the Military Council, and M. A. Kuznetsov was appointed chief of staff.
The group's headquarters was in Chita. Somewhat later (at the suggestion of G. M. Stern), the Trans-Baikal Military District was charged with supplying all types of weapons to the active troops in Mongolia."
By this time a new clash had already begun....
G. Stern and G. Zhukov.